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Our aim in this paper is to contribute toward acknowledging the general role of opposites
as an organizing principle in the human mind. We support this claim in relation to human
reasoning by collecting evidence from various studies which shows that “thinking in
opposites” is not only involved in formal logical thinking, but can also be applied in both
deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as in problem solving. We also describe the
results of a series of studies which, although they have been developed within a number
of different theoretical frameworks based on various methodologies, all demonstrate
that giving hints or training reasoners to think in terms of opposites improves their
performance in tasks in which spontaneous thinking may lead to classic biases and
impasses. Since we all possess an intuitive idea of what opposites are, prompting people
to “think in opposites” is something which is undoubtedly within everyone’s reach and
in the final section, we discuss the potential of this strategy and suggest possible future
research directions of systematic testing the benefits that might arise from the use of this
technique in contexts beyond those tested thus far. Ascertaining the conditions in which
reasoners might benefit will also help in terms of clarifying the underlying mechanisms
from the point of view, for instance, of analytical, conscious processing vs. automatic,
unconscious processing.
Keywords: opposites, contrast class, inductive and deductive reasoning, insight problem solving, counterfactual
thinking
INTRODUCTION
Humans have an intuitive idea of opposites in addition to an intuitive idea of what constitutes
similarity, diversity, and sameness. Same-different tasks have been extensively used in Psychology
to study perception and categorization without the need to explain to participants what the terms
“same” or “different” mean. We are all familiar with the experience of needing to change an item
we have just bought when we notice a defect and we expect the salesperson in the shop to exchange
it with an identical item (that is, the same size, color, and design etc.). If the assistant tries to give us
a different item or even a similar one, he/she will need to convince us to accept it as a replacement
since we see it is not the same as the original item. In the same way, we immediately recognize
whether two sounds are identical, similar or different in terms of a series of opposite features, for
example, high-low, increasing-decreasing, regular-irregular or pleasant-unpleasant. These are all
understood by us as being opposite attributes without the need for any formal definition. These
might seem to be quite trivial examples, but their obviousness shows us that we readily acknowledge
how basic and pervasive these relationships are in the structure of our everyday lives.
Branchini et al. Thinking in Opposites
The idea that similarity is transversal to many different
cognitive functions has been accepted in Psychology at least
since Tversky’s seminal work (Tversky, 1977). “Similarity
is a central construct in cognitive science. It is involved in
explanations of cognitive processes as diverse as memory
retrieval, categorization, visual search, problem solving,
induction, language processing, and social judgment (see Hahn
et al., 2003, and references therein). Consequently, the theoretical
understanding of similarity affects research in all of these areas”
(Hahn et al., 2009). Any cognitive scientist engaged in describing
how human perception, categorization, language or reasoning
works will continuously come across similarity as a key concept
in the organizing principle by means of which individuals classify
objects, form concepts, and make generalizations (for a review,
see Goldstone, 1994). We much less frequently hear cognitive
scientists making references to opposites when discussing the
same processes. Our aim with the present paper is to encourage
cognitive scientists that the role of opposites in cognition
should not be relegated to formal logical matters such as those
traditionally exemplified by “the square of opposition” (Figure 1;
see Beziau and Basti, 2016 for an update on the developments of
the square of opposition within modern logics).
In the following sections of the present paper (sections
Thinking in Terms of Opposites in Order to Figure Out
Alternatives in Everyday Life, Opposites and Deductive
Reasoning, Opposites and Inductive Reasoning, and Opposites
and Insight Problem Solving) we draw attention to the role
that opposites play in reasoning processes such as everyday
counterfactual thinking, classic deductive and inductive
reasoning tasks and the representational changes required
in certain reasoning tasks. An inspection of the contexts in
which opposites are implied in spontaneous human thinking
and of others in which they are crucially needed (even
though not spontaneously applied) suggests that the notion of
FIGURE 1 | The square of opposition refers to a diagram which was
introduced in traditional logics. It represents four types of logical relationships
holding between four basic forms of propositions: universal affirmatives (A),
universal negations (E), particular affirmatives (I), and particular negations (O).
opposites supports human thinking in a number of ways. If
we acknowledge this, it follows that opposites can be regarded
as a general organizing principle for the human mind rather
than simply a specific relationship (however respectable) merely
related to logics. This broader perspective on opposites which
sees them as useful in a variety of reasoning processes leads to
new questions and suggests new directions for research, as we
propose in the final section of the paper (section Discussion).
Before addressing all these points, we refer to three different
approaches which have been developed within the field of
Cognitive science in the last 20 years that—although in different
ways—all deem opposites to be a general and basic phenomenon.
What is fundamental to these approaches is the idea that
opposites are a primal organizing principle for the human mind
which applies to language, perception and relational reasoning.
(i) Cognitive linguists have noted and discussed the
pervasiveness of antonyms in natural human languages (see,
for instance, Jones, 2002, 2007; Paradis et al., 2009). It has
been acknowledged that opposites represent a special semantic
relationship which is more easily learned and more intuitively
understood than any other semantic relationship and indeed
non-experts can easily identify opposites, despite being unable
to formulate a clear definition of the requisite for two meanings
to be opposites (e.g., Kagan, 1984; Miller and Fellbaum, 1991;
Fellbaum, 1995; Jones, 2002; Murphy, 2003; Croft and Cruse,
2004). It has been shown that this primary intuition has its roots
in infants’ pre-verbal categorization (e.g., Casasola et al., 2003;
Casasola, 2008).
(ii) A second approach involves the hypothesis that opposites
are a specific, basic, perceived relationship. This approach (the
main theoretical and methodological framework of which are
summarized in Bianchi and Savardi, 2008a) has led to various
experimental explorations of the abilities of adults and children
to recognize whether certain configurations are “opposite” as
compared to “different” or “similar” and to also produce opposite
configurations. These explorations referred to various perceptual
domains and contents and involved, for example, simple visual
configurations (e.g., Bianchi and Savardi, 2006; Schepis et al.,
2009; Savardi et al., 2010; Bianchi et al., 2017a), everyday
objects and/or environments (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2011, 2013,
2017c), human body postures (e.g., Bianchi and Savardi, 2008b;
Bianchi et al., 2014), and acoustic stimuli (e.g., Biassoni, 2009;
Bianchi et al., 2017b). The results emerging from these studies
indicated that (a) the participants were consistent in defining
the point along a dimension at which a property stops being
perceived as pertaining to one extreme of the dimension (e.g.,
near on the dimension near/far) and starts to be perceived as
an instance of the opposite property (e.g., in this case far) or
of an intermediate region with variations that are not perceived
as pertaining to either one pole or the other (e.g., neither near
nor far); (b) two configurations are perceived to be opposites
when they show a maximum contrast in terms of a perceptually
salient property—usually regarding the orientation or direction
of the configuration—within a condition of otherwise overall
invariance (some examples are provided in Figure 2); and (c)
due evidently to this close connection between the perception
of opposition and the perception of opposite orientation in an
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 715696
Branchini et al. Thinking in Opposites
FIGURE 2 | Some examples of pairs of configurations formed of two simple
bidimensional figures which are perceived as similar (1st column), opposite
(2nd column), and different (3rd column)—Bianchi and Savardi (2008a).
overall invariant configuration, opposition is also perceived in
configurations involving mirror symmetry, including people’s
perception of their own body reflection in a plane mirror.
(iii) A third approach focuses on people’s ability to discern
three different types of oppositional relationships between
objects, concepts and ideas, that is anomaly, antinomy,
and antithesis. The recognition of deviance (anomaly),
incompatibility (antinomy), and opposition (antithesis) has
been shown to be critical not only for complex thought
(Chinn and Brewer, 1993; Holyoak, 2012), but also with regard
to professional abilities in medicine (Dumas et al., 2014),
chemistry (Bellocchi and Ritchie, 2011), and engineering
(Dumas and Schmidt, 2015; Dumas et al., 2016). This approach
was developed over the course of a decade in relation to a
number of domains (see Alexander, 2012; Dumas et al., 2013;
Alexander et al., 2016) and a Test of Relational Reasoning
(TORR) was developed to measure the aforementioned forms of
relational reasoning, and also analogy which refers to thinking
in terms of similarity rather than opposition (Hesse, 1959;
Goswami and Mead, 1992; Alexander et al., 1997; Dunbar, 2001;
Hofstadter, 2001; Gentner et al., 2003; Braasch and Goldman,
2010). The anomalous reasoning scale of the TORR gauges
respondents’ ability to discriminate a deviance or a discrepancy
by recognizing an object that does not fit a given or typical
pattern. The antinomous reasoning scale measures the ability
to reason with mutual exclusivity between categories and to
recognize a paradoxical situation (i.e., a situation in which two
conditions cannot both be true). The antithetical reasoning scale
measures the ability to recognize a direct oppositional relation
between situations. The TORR measures the ability to recognize
these relationships both with regard to visual stimuli and to
written sentences.
This study focuses on the role of opposites in relation to
various types of reasoning tasks. In this sense, we come closer to
the third approach described in the previous section (point iii
above). However, the phenomenon is observed from a standpoint
which is less technical than that presupposed by that approach
and is more similar to the intuitive idea of opposition relating
to the other two approaches (that is points i and ii above).
Indeed, when we refer to “thinking in opposites,” we do not
refer to any technical or logical definition which, conversely,
constructs such as antithesis, contradiction, and counterfactuality
necessarily imply. We start, more simply, from the consideration
that when humans conceive of a variation from a given state,
object, action or situation, they necessarily do it with reference
to opposites. For the sake of intellectual honesty, it is to be
noted that the roots of this idea were already present in the work
of Aristotle (1984, Cat. 5, 4a 30–34), but have been explicitly
applied to the human cognitive system in more recent times
(e.g., Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014; Paradis, 2005; Bianchi and Savardi,
2008a). By saying that every kind of perceptually identifiable
variation between two objects relates in some way to opposition,
we do not mean that the final outcome is necessarily globally
perceived as opposite; from a global perspective, two objects
might simply appear diverse or similar. This depends on the
number of features which are transformed and on which features
are transformed. Indeed, in the case of similarity, diversity and
opposition, both the number of common, distinctive features and
the salience of those features are critical factors (the literature
supporting this statement is reviewed in Bianchi and Savardi,
2008a, p. 129–130). However, in order to stand up to an analytical
(i.e., local) inspection, any variation must necessarily consist of a
change from one property or state to another property or state
along a dimension which is cognitively defined by two opposite
properties. This can involve varying degrees of alteration,
for example, something small can be transformed either into
something big (i.e., its opposite) or into which is still perceived
as small but is less small than before. The transformation may
also comprise a variation which shifts toward an intermediate
property (e.g., something small becomes something which is
perceived as neither small nor big).
The fact that there is a close link between non-identity and
opposition has also emerged in research investigating the extent
to which the negation of one property (e.g., not good) implies
affirming the opposite property (e.g., bad). For instance, “The
water is not hot” makes us think of water than might be warm,
lukewarm or cool. It has been empirically proved that inferring
one of these options in preference to the others depends in part
on rhetoric aspects (e.g., Colston, 1999; Horn and Kato, 2000)
and in part on semantic (e.g., Paradis and Willners, 2006) and
perceptual aspects (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2011) relating to both
the nature of the negated property itself and the opposite pole.
In any case, understanding negation seems to entail a mental
construction of a model implying a variation from the negated
situation identified within a dimension with two opposite poles
(Kaup et al., 2006, 2007).
This idea that every variation (including negation) which
occurs along a dimension with opposite poles applies to the
present paper in the sense that we see that “thinking in opposites”
becomes the natural background for creating mental alternatives.
These may be alternatives to reality which relate to how past
events could have been different (section Thinking in Terms of
Opposites in Order to Figure Out Alternatives in Everyday Life),
alternative models in deductive reasoning (section Opposites and
Deductive Reasoning); alternative outcomes in hypothesis testing
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(section Opposites and Inductive Reasoning); or alternative
representations of a problem in insight problem solving (section
Opposites and Insight Problem Solving). The goal of this paper is
to provide evidence of the plausibility of this idea and to stimulate
new directions for future research.
THINKING IN TERMS OF OPPOSITES IN
ORDER TO FIGURE OUT ALTERNATIVES
IN EVERYDAY LIFE
As psychologists have shown, the range of applications for
counterfactual thinking is extensive. It supports thinking
processes in various reasoning tasks (Byrne, 2016, 2017, 2018)
and it is often activated when one is engaged in justifying
or defending past events (Markman et al., 2008) or negative
performances (Markman and Tetlock, 2000; McCrea, 2008; Tyser
et al., 2012), as well as when people formulate intents or take
decisions regarding future events (Markman et al., 1993; Epstude
and Roese, 2008; Ferrante et al., 2013).
Although the number of counterfactual alternatives to a
given event is potentially infinite, people only tend to create
a limited number of alternatives. They transform exceptional
events into normal events rather than vice versa (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982a), uncontrollable events become controllable
(Girotto et al., 1991; Davis et al., 1995), inaction is replaced by
action (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982b; Ritov and Baron, 1990),
changes regarding the first events in a causal chain are prioritized
over the last events (Wells et al., 1987; Segura et al., 2002) and,
in contrast, the last events are changed rather than the first
events in a sequence of causally independent events (Miller and
Gunasegaram, 1990).
What is especially relevant to the present analysis is that no
matter the content of the alternative scenario, counterfactual
thinking involves imagining the opposite of what really occurred
(Fillenbaum, 1974; Santamaria et al., 2005; Byrne, 2018). An
example of counterfactual thinking such as “If he had caught the
plane, he would have arrived on time” makes us think about both
missing the plane and arriving late as opposed to catching the
plane and arriving on time. “If I hadn’t forgotten my umbrella,
I would not be soaked to the skin now” makes us think about
remembering to take the umbrella as opposed to forgetting it, and
about being dry as opposed to being drenched.
Literature on the development of children has shown that by
the age of 7 they are able to compare what actually occurred
with alternatives to reality (e.g., German, 1999; Beck et al., 2006;
Rafetseder et al., 2010) and to understand emotions based on
counterfactual reasoning. That is to say that they understand
how “thinking about how things could have been better” can
make one feel regret, and that “thinking about how things could
have been worse” can make one feel relief (see Kuczaj and Daly,
1979; Harris et al., 1996; Amsel and Smalley, 2000; Guttentag and
Ferrell, 2004). Curiosity about alternative outcomes is already
present in children of 4 and 5 years (e.g., Fitzgibbon et al., 2019),
and can therefore be said to predate counterfactual reasoning
in its strict sense. At this age, children also understand that
by saying something “almost happened” (e.g., “it almost fell”)
involves thinking not only about what really happened but also
about the event that did not occur (e.g., Beck and Guthrie, 2011).
OPPOSITES AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING
In this section, we focus on three phenomena which give an
idea of the pervasiveness of opposites in deductive reasoning.
Let us start with a classic example, Wason’s four-card selection
task (Wason, 1966, 1968). This type of task requires the ability
to produce valid inferences from the information expressed in
the premises. A set of four cards is placed on a table and the
participants taking part in the experiment are told that each of
these cards has a number printed on one side and a letter on
the other side. They can, of course, only see one side of the
cards, some of which are number side up and some of which are
letter side up. Their task is to determine which cards need to be
turned over in order to test the proposition “if there is a vowel on
one side of the card then there is an even number on the other
side.” In order to solve the syllogism (as required in all deductive
reasoning tasks), counterexamples to the initial hypothesis need
to be found. Indeed, if one single counterexample can be found,
then the hypothesis has to be considered invalid, and therefore
also the entire inference leading to the hypothesis is wrong
(Geiger and Oberauer, 2007; Markovits et al., 2010). The first
mental model that comes to mind confirms the association
“vowel-even number” and people turn over the card with a
vowel on it (let’s call it the p-property card) and the one
with an even number on it (let’s call it the q-property card).
However, only when the search for counterexamples fails can the
initial hypothesis be confirmed. The correct procedure to follow
involves testing the combination of the antecedent with the
negation of the consequent (i.e., p and not-q). The frequency with
which this strategy is spontaneously activated depends on the
contents of the syllogism (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Manktelow
and Over, 1991; Sperber et al., 1995; Girotto et al., 2001) and on
whether the participants are given a prompt that in order to prove
that a rule is true, they need to prove there is no case in which
the rule is false (Augustinova, 2008). Independently of whether
counterfactual thinking is spontaneously activated or prompted
by a hint, inWason’s classic task we clearly see this in action since
thinking “not-q” implies thinking in opposites, and “not even”
numbers immediately make one think of odd numbers.
A second phenomenon in which opposites are in effect
implied concerns deductive reasoning involving scalar
implicatures. Scalar implicatures underly the interpretation
of certain categorical syllogisms. Reasoners attribute an implicit
meaning to an utterance beyond the literal meaning and
also beyond its strict, logical meaning, based on implicit
conversational pragmatic assumptions (Papafragou and
Musolino, 2003; Chierchia, 2004; Papafragou and Skordos,
2016). Scalar implicatures usually involve quantifiers, but in
any case, entail an interpretation along a scale of possibilities.
The listener will assume that the speaker has a reason for not
choosing a stronger term on the scale concerned. This can be
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TABLE 1 | Truth table relating to propositions P and Q (for an explanation, see the
main text).
First model P Q Vowel Even number
Second model P Not-Q Vowel Odd number
Third model Not-P Q Consonant Even number
Fourth model Not-P Not-Q Consonant Odd number
clearly seen in the use of “some”—as in (1) which suggests
the meaning “not all,” even though by saying “some,” logically
speaking “all” cannot be excluded. Assuming that the speaker
is trying to be helpful and say what he/she genuinely considers
to be relevant to the conversation, the fact that he/she chooses
“some” prompts the listener to think that the other person is not
in a position to make an informationally stronger statement (e.g.,
Mary ate all of the cakes). The listener thus infers that the second
statement (i.e., Mary did not eat all of the cakes) is true.
What we want to emphasize in this paper is that scalar
implicatures necessarily require one to think along a scale which
has opposites at each extreme. The underlying dimension in
(1) goes from “all” to “none.” In the second example, the scale
implied refers to the number of bears. The scalar implicature
involved (“three-more than three”) is based on the contrast
between “the same quantity” and “a different quantity,” which
might be more than three or less than three. In this case too
(assuming the speaker is trying to be helpful and say what he/she
really saw and considers to be relevant), the listener infers that
they saw exactly three bears and not more or less than three. The
third example works in a similar way, but it plays on the contrast
between “and-or,” that is, between “both and only one of the two”
(Horn, 1984).
(1) a. Mary ate some of the cakes.
b. Mary did not eat all of the cakes.
(2) a. We saw three bears.
b. We did not see more than three bears.
(3) a. Elmo will buy a car or a boat.
b. Elmo will not buy both a car and a boat.
Some recent studies have focused on the role played by the
cognitive structure of the scale in question in terms of pragmatic
strengthening and the computation of an implicature. This idea
is that the semantic structure of an adjective, for example,
will systematically encourage or block certain inferences (e.g.,
van Tiel et al., 2016; Gotzner et al., 2018; Leffel et al., 2019).
The structure of a scale is operationalized with reference to
boundedness, the extremeness of the stronger pole, the nature
of the weaker pole (i.e., whether it is minimum, relative, or a
zero-point indicating the absence of the property), the distance
between the two poles and their polarity (i.e., positive or
negative). This puts constraints on the range of potential values
and thereby determines the alternatives which can be used in the
computation of an implicature (see also van Tiel and Schaeken,
2017).
The third phenomenon we refer to concerns reasoning in
relation to logical connectives such as inclusive disjunctions (i.e.,
“P or Q or both”) and exclusive disjunctions (i.e., “either P or
Q”). The truth table of any binary connective relating to two
propositions (P, Q) holds four truth-value outcomes, in a defined
order (see Table 1). The first row refers to the condition in which
P is true and Q is true; the second to when P is true and Q is
false; the third row to when P is false and Q is true and the fourth
row to when P and Q are both false. The conditional “if P, then
Q” implied in Wason’s 4 card problem is only false in the second
condition, that is, when P is true and Q false, which, in effect, is
the condition which will solve the task.
Many logical fallacies derive from an inappropriate
interpretation of disjunctive connectives. The exclusive
disjunction (“either P or Q”) is true only when the conditions
described by the second and third row of the truth table hold,
that is, P is true and Q is false or vice versa. Conversely, the
inclusive disjunction (“P or Q or both”) is true in the first three
conditions and false only in the fourth one (i.e., when P and
Q are both false). In the case of a basic inference in which
the major premise is an inclusive disjunction and the minor
premise is affirmative (modus tollens), given the affirmation of
P, reasoners tend to conclude not-Q, and given the affirmation
of Q they tend to conclude not-P (e.g., Evans et al., 1993).
This would be valid in the case of an exclusive disjunction,
whereas we are dealing here with an inclusive disjunction.
According to Robert and Brisson (2016, p. 383 ff.), and assuming
the explanation of the fallacies in conditional reasoning
provided by the mental model theory in terms of incomplete
representations of the premises is correct (Johnson-Laird, 1983,
2010; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani, 2014), conditional fallacies
all depend on the counterexample to the fallacious conclusion
not being taken into account. As Table 1 demonstrates, the
second, third and fourth models all imply negation, that is
they refer to something which is not-P or not-Q. As stated in
the introduction to this paper (section Introduction), from a
cognitive point of view negation presupposes opposition. In
the examples in Table 1, not-even means odd, not-vowel means
a consonant. However, not all domains are conceptualized as
being mutually exclusive. The binary or graded structure of
a dimension (e.g., Kennedy and McNally, 2005) substantially
influences the amount of shift which spontaneously comes
to mind. The semantic meaning of the sentence John is not
handsome merely entails that John is something less than
handsome, that is, he might be attractive, average looking or
even ugly, depending also on other contextual and pragmatic
factors (e.g., Paradis, 2008). Despite the fact that this is a matter
of modulation, there is in any case a presupposed reference
to opposition.
OPPOSITES AND INDUCTIVE REASONING
Hypothesis testing epitomizes the process of inductive reasoning
(Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Vartanian et al., 2003). It underlies
not only scientific reasoning (Mahoney and DeMonbreun,
1977; Langley et al., 1987; Klahr and Dunbar, 1988), but also
many classes of human judgments, including social inferences
regarding individual or group behaviors (e.g., Nisbett and Ross,
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1980; DiDonato et al., 2011). The process of hypothesis testing
involves forming hypotheses, and then gathering evidence in
order to test and revise these hypotheses (e.g., Klayman and Ha,
1987; Heit, 2000; Evans, 2007).
Wason’s rule discovery task (Wason, 1960) represents
the standard paradigm employed to study hypothesis testing
behavior. In this task, the participants are asked to discover
the arithmetic rule devised by the experimenter that applies to
a series of three number sequences. They are given an initial
sequence (2-4-6) that fits in with the rule and are invited
to construct their own series of three number sequences in
order to test any hypotheses they formulate about the rule. The
experimenter provides feedback and once the participants feel
confident that they have found the rule, they announce their
finding. Generally, the process goes on until the participants
come up with the right rule or it is stopped after a fixed
amount of time. This task requires the reasoners to create
not only series of numbers that confirm their idea regarding
the rule, but also series of numbers which disconfirm the rule
(Rossi et al., 2001; Evans, 2007). Most people do not proceed
in this way, and this task illustrates how people generally tend
to follow a confirmation bias in hypothesis testing tasks. In
fact, only around 20% of participants find the correct rule
at the first attempt (Wason, 1960; Farris and Revlin, 1989b).
Analyses of the reasoning process used by those participants
who find the correct rule at the first attempt revealed that
they applied a counterfactual strategy both when generating
hypotheses and when testing them (Klayman andHa, 1987; Farris
and Revlin, 1989a,b; Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Gale and Ball,
2012). Counterfactual hypotheses were formed by varying one
thing at a time; for instance, if the initial hypothesis was “any
series of three even numbers in increasing order”, participants
created a counterfactual hypothesis such as “any series of three
odd numbers in increasing order” or “any series of three even
numbers in decreasing order” or “any series of three numbers
which are the same” (Tschirgi, 1980). The examples not only
make it clear that each of the hypotheses transforms and tests
the effect of making one transformation at a time, but also show
that the transformations are based on opposites (i.e., even is
transformed into odd, increasing is transformed into decreasing
and different numbers are transformed into the same numbers).
There has been a great deal of debate, in some way inspired
by Popper (2005) falsification model, on the exclusive need
to adopt disconfirmatory strategies in inductive inference tasks
(e.g., Farris and Revlin, 1989a,b, 1991; Gorman, 1991) and
various attempts have been made to train participants to use
disconfirmatory strategies on the 2-4-6 rule discovery task or in
other similar tasks. One of these is the ‘Eleusis’ card game (first
invented by Robert Abbott in1956). The problem is essentially
very similar toWason’s triples task. The game involves one player
(the dealer) dealing a row of cards in sequence and this person
then chooses a secret rule to determine which card or cards can
be played subsequently. The other players take turns to try and
guess the rule for the sequence by placing one or more cards on
the table. The dealer says whether these cards fit in with the rule
or not. Gorman et al. (1984) trained participants to apply either
a confirmatory strategy (“test your guesses by concentrating on
playing cards that will be correct”) or a disconfirmatory strategy
(“test your guesses by deliberately playing cards that you think
will be wrong”), or a mixed strategy (“first, concentrate on getting
right answers until you have a guess; then test your guess by
deliberately playing cards you are sure will be wrong”). Similar
strategies were tested by Tweney et al. (1980), but using the 2-
4-6 problem. Gorman et al. (1984) found that groups using a
disconfirmatory strategy found the correct rule 72% of the time,
those applying a combined strategy were correct 50% of the time
and those using a confirmatory strategy were only right in 25% of
cases. Tweney et al. (1980) found that a disconfirmatory strategy
was easily induced, but it did not lead to greater efficiency and
neither did a mixed strategy. A comparison of the two studies
suggests that a critical element is whether participants are given
feedback on whether their guesses are consistent with the rule
or not. Indeed, in Gorman and Gorman’s study Gorman and
Gorman’s 1984, the participants were allowed to make as many
guesses as they liked within a half hour time limit and playing
a maximum of 60 cards. They were requested to write down
their guesses, the number of the card and the time at which
they made the guess, but received no feedback until the end of
the experiment.
Improvements in performance were generally found when
the participants were prompted to work on the discovery of
two interrelated rules (this condition is known as dual goal
instruction). Success rates at the first attempt typically rise to over
60% in the dual goal instruction condition, when complementary
rules are considered (e.g., Tweney et al., 1980; Tukey, 1986;
Gorman et al., 1987; Wharton et al., 1993). Why does this type
of manipulation make a difference? Gale and Ball (2006, 2009)
hypothesized and subsequently verified that a critical element is
whether the two rules stimulate participants to think in terms of
contrast classes, that is, in term of relevant oppositional contrasts.
As confirmed in a further study on finding rules for triple
sequences (Gale and Ball, 2012), the facilitatory effect of the dual
goal instruction was greater when the participants were given the
6-4-2 triple sequence as an exemplar of the second rule (with a
success rate of around 75%), than when the exemplar was 9-8-
1 (with only a 36% success rate) or the 4-4-4 sequence (with a
20% success rate). The 6-4-2 triple makes the relevant contrast
immediately evident; the 9-8-1 triple contrasts in more than one
dimension and thus only to some extent shifts the participants’
attention toward the critical characteristics while the 4-4-4 triple
suggests a contrast class (same vs. different numbers) which is not
useful in any way.
The idea of a “contrast class” refers here to a psychological
rather than logical concept (Oaksford, 2002, p. 140). It does
not merely identify the logical complement set. In Oaksford’s
example, the sentence “Person X is not drinking coffee”, entails a
logical complement set which includes all beverages except coffee
(i.e., whisky, cola, or sparkling water etc.), but the immediate
hypothesis that comes to people’s minds is that the person must
be drinking some other hot beverage such as tea. Thus, we see
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that the identification of a contrasting set is driven by cognitive
“relevance” (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995) which means that
reasoners focus on one or more relevant contrasts out of a
range of alternatives. These in turn might depend on various
aspects such as perceptual relevance, semantic factors, and also
contextual aspects (e.g., situational, socio-linguistic, stylistic, or
prosodic factors). These influence what the reasoner may decide
constitutes a contrast. The identification of a contrast tends to
be more straightforward if there is clearly a binary opposite, for
example, even-odd, ascending-descending, or vowel-consonant
(for a discussion of the concept of relevance in the identification
of contrast sets, see Tenbrink and Freksa, 2009, but also Paradis
et al., 2009 for an analysis of the more general issue of opposites
and canonicity). We return to this point in the final discussion.
In line with the main claim of this paper, we suggest that an
explanation for why stimulating reasoners to think in opposites
by means of facilitatory hints involving contrast classes seems to
be more effective than prompting them to apply disconfirmatory
strategies (e.g., Tweney et al., 1980) might depend on the
fact that this strategy does not ask people to focus on testing
hypotheses they expect to be wrong. In contrast, it allows
them to make a positive search using opposites to identify
potential falsifiers of the rule. This is not very different to Gale
and Ball’s suggestion (Gale and Ball’s 2012, p. 416–417) which
is, however, based on Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) iterative
counterfactual model.
OPPOSITES AND INSIGHT PROBLEM
SOLVING
Another domain in which thinking in terms of opposites is
crucial is problem solving. The process of problem solving
starts off from an initial state, such as a given situation or
problem statement; the solver works toward the goal state
(i.e., the solved problem) passing through various intermediate
states along the way. Insight problems cannot be solved by
means of the mere application of predefined rules and they are
typically characterized by a moment when the solution arrives
suddenly and unexpectedly (often known as the “Aha!” moment)
after an impasse, usually as part of a stadial process (Ohlsson,
1992; Öllinger et al., 2014; Fedor et al., 2015). It is crucial
that before this revelatory moment there has been some form
of representational change which has allowed the person to
overcome a blockage deriving from a former (unproductive)
representation of the problem (Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger
et al., 2008; Ohlsson, 2011) and various studies have focused on
the mechanisms underlying this change and on how to facilitate
it (see Gilhooly et al., 2015).
The relevance of opposites in this representational change
was first theorized by the Gestalt psychologists Duncker (1945)
and Wertheimer (1945/1959). According to Wertheimer, solving
a problem means creating new groupings within the overall
structure of the problem, by unifying the elements of the problem
that were initially separated and dividing elements that were
initially unified thereby creating a newmental organization of the
problem (Wertheimer, 1945/1959). Duncker (1945) pointed out
that what is needed in this restructuring is a shift of function in
the elements within a system, and he explicitly defined this shift
in terms of opposites. In the last 10 years, a number of studies
have been conducted that offer direct or indirect evidence that
thinking in opposites supports a relaxation of the constraints that
prevent the reasoners from seeing the solution. For example, in
the ping-pong ball problem (Ansburg and Dominowski, 2000),
reasoners are asked to work out how to throw a ping-pong ball
(without bouncing it off any surface or tying it to anything)
so that it will travel a short distance, come to a dead stop and
then roll back on its tracks. In order to reach the solution, it
is necessary to imagine the ball following a vertical trajectory,
but this contrasts with the mental model which initially comes
to peoples’ minds which contains the implicit assumption of a
horizontal trajectory (Murray and Byrne, 2013). This bias toward
a horizontal trajectory is the cause of the impasse. The problem
solver needs to stop focusing on a horizontal trajectory and start
thinking of a vertical trajectory in order to resolve the impasse.
Explicitly stimulating participants (either bymeans of training
or using hints) to explore the initial structure of a problem in
terms of its salient spatial features and to systematically transform
them into their opposites has proved to be effective in a series
of studies (e.g., Branchini et al., 2015a,b, 2016; Bianchi et al.,
2020). To exemplify the point, let’s consider the eight coin
problem in which the participants are asked to start from a given
configuration of eight disks (see the top image in Figure 3), and
to move only two coins in such a way that the new arrangement
will respect the condition that each coin only touches three other
coins. The moves which need to be made and the final solution
are represented in the bottom image in Figure 3. If one looks
at the initial configuration, one notices various aspects: that the
configuration is oriented horizontally; that there is the same
number of coins in each of the two rows; that they aremisaligned;
that they are united to form a single group of coins and that they
lie on the same plane (i.e., it is a bidimensional configuration).
Encouraging the participants to focus on the properties they
identify while exploring the structure of the problem and then to
think of these in terms of their opposites (i.e., horizontal-vertical,
equal-different number, aligned-misaligned, united-separated and
bidimensional-three dimensional) helped the participants to
ascertain which aspect they needed to transform, increased the
number of attempts made and led to a better performance. In
the eight coin problem, the two pairs of opposites which are
functional are united-separated (since it is necessary to split the
group of coins into two separate subgroups) and bidimensional-
three dimensional (since one needs to position two of the coins
over the other three so that they are then superimposed and no
longer coplanar).
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have reviewed studies carried out in the last 20
years to explore the idea that opposition is a general organizing
principle for the human mind. In addition to the research revised
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FIGURE 3 | Initial configuration (Top image) and final configuration (Bottom
image) in the eight coin problem (Ormerod et al., 2002). The arrow represents
the moves which need to be made.
in the introduction (section Introduction) which emphasized
the importance of opposites as a basic structure for human
perception, human language, and relational reasoning, in this
paper we put forward the idea that they are also a pervasive
structure which is implied in various reasoning tasks. We have
shown that “thinking in opposites” is fundamental to how
people naturally think when they imagine alternatives to reality
in everyday counterfactual reasoning (see section Thinking in
Terms of Opposites in Order to Figure Out Alternatives in
Everyday Life), that it is presupposed in various deductive
reasoning phenomena, from understanding scalar implicatures
to counterfactual reasoning in basic conditional reasoning, as
well as in reasoning about disjunctive connectives (see section
Opposites and Deductive Reasoning), that it supports inductive
thinking in that it is involved in the identification of contrast class
sets which are crucial to hypothesis testing (see section Opposites
and Inductive Reasoning) and that it upholds representational
change in insight problem solving thereby paving the way to
the resolution of the problem (see section Opposites and Insight
Problem Solving). In this sense this overview might lead to the
impression that we do, in fact, use opposites more than we think.
On the other hand, as part of the picture which emerged
from the review of the literature discussed in this paper, there is
the consideration that counterfactual thinking is spontaneously
used in some circumstances in everyday life, but is not so often
spontaneously activated in inductive and deductive reasoning,
and neither is it used as a purposeful strategy in problem
solving. However, various studies investigating possible ways to
stimulate reasoners to overcome typical reasoning biases in all
of these domains suggest that giving them a hint to “think in
opposites” points them in the right direction and improves their
performance. In this sense opposites are used less than they
could be. The facilitatory effect of using opposites as a strategy
has been found in some studies on people’s performance in
classic deductive tasks (e.g., Augustinova, 2008), inWason’s triple
inductive task (e.g., Gale and Ball, 2009, 2012), and in visuo-
spatial insight problem solving (e.g., Murray and Byrne, 2013;
Branchini et al., 2015a,b, 2016; Bianchi et al., 2020).
The tasks and prompts used in the abovementioned
studies are very different from each other and are also very
specific. Further experimentation is therefore needed before any
conclusions suggesting that encouraging people to think in terms
of opposites kick starts an intuitive strategy that enhances their
performance can be generalized beyond the conditions of validity
tested thus far. For instance, Branchini et al. (2015a, 2016) tested
the effects of implicit hints and explicit training programs based
on thinking in opposites in classic visuo-spatial insight problems.
They found that this was effective both in terms of modifying the
contents of the attempts made (i.e., the choice of properties to
focus on), and in terms of the success rate. This has, however, not
been tested with verbal insight problems (such as those studied,
for instance, by Dow and Mayer, 2004; Macchi and Bagassi,
2015; Patrick et al., 2015), and neither has an adaptation of the
training been tested in a hypothesis testing condition, such as
for example Wason’s triplets condition. If the seed triple 2-4-6 in
Wason’s problem leads to the hypothesis that the rule involves
an “ascending series of even numbers, regularly increasing by
two,” an explicit prompt to think in opposites would immediately
suggest the precise direction in which to search, that is, testing
whether the series is descending rather than ascending, whether
it is made up of odd rather than even numbers, or whether it has
irregular rather than regular intervals between the numbers, and
so on.
Another aspect that future research might help to clarify
concerns the relation between thinking in opposites and Type
1 and Type 2 processes as defined by Evans and Stanovich
(2013a,b). Type 1 processes refer to fast, unconscious, automatic
processing, Type 2 to slow, conscious, controlled processing
(see also Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011). The
various different types of prompts used in the studies revised in
this paper involved, in fact, both implicit and explicit suggestions.
In the studies carried out by Augustinova (2008), Gale and
Ball (2012), Murray and Byrne (2013) and Branchini et al.
(2015a), implicit hints were enough to improve the participants’
performance. These consisted of, respectively, a falsification cue,
a contrast class cue, a counterexample, and an invitation to
list the features of the problem and their opposites. There was
no explanation as to why this would help. In these studies,
the facilitating factors are implicit processes (which hinge on
Type 1 processes) since the participants were exposed to the
hints without any awareness of how they could be useful. In
other studies from which a facilitatory effect emerged (see the
studies done by Branchini et al., 2016; Bianchi et al., 2020), the
participants were explicitly trained to use thinking in opposites
as a strategy. This represents an analytically conscious suggestion
which hinges on Type 2 processes. Based on these results, a
provisional hypothesis that a prompt might be effective on both
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levels, within specific limits, seems to emerge, but further studies
are of course needed to consolidate or disprove this.
Another aspect that deserves further investigation concerns
whether this strategy is effective both when individuals are
working alone or in groups. Content related hints to use
opposites turned out to be effective in individual settings in the
studies done by Gale and Ball (2012) and Murray and Byrne
(2013), whereas positive effects resulting from general training
to think in opposites were found in small group settings in
the studies carried out by Bianchi et al. (2020) and Branchini
et al. (2015a, 2016). Augustinova also worked with groups
(Augustinova et al., 2005; Augustinova, 2008). Does this mean
that more generic prompts suffice in group contexts whereas
a content specific prompt is needed in individual contexts?
Whether this relates to the processing dynamics which are
natural in groups but are not present in the case of individual
reasoners (Tindale and Kameda, 2000; Tindale et al., 2001) is an
aspect which is worth investigating further, taking into account,
however, the fact that it is always easier to contradict another
person’s best guess than it is to question one’s own best guess
(Poletiek, 1996).
Notably, as mentioned in the introduction to this paper,
the strength of a prompt to generically “think in opposites” is
based on the intuitive nature of opposition that it presupposes,
as compared to more complex technical or logical definitions
of opposition (i.e., counterfactuality, antynomy, and logical
opposition). This means that it can easily become a deliberate
strategy to produce systematic manipulations of an initial
problem in order to resolve it. Moreover, since opposites, by
definition, consist of pairs of properties, they offer a method of
opening up the space within which a search is carried out, while
at the same time giving precise directions. This combination
of openness and boundary shifting fits in with the requisites
of an effective cognitive heuristic according to, for instance,
Öllinger et al. (2013). Therefore, opposites allow one to think
not only in terms of not-x, but also in terms of alternatives
which are clearly identifiable since they lie along well-defined
dimensions. Contrasts are not set in stone.Whatmakes a contrast
relevant depends on contextual aspects, the mental framework,
and various linguistic and pragmatic conditions (e.g., Paradis
et al., 2009; Tenbrink and Freksa, 2009). This strategy, therefore,
is one which is adaptive and flexible, and the variability of
alternatives that come up is extremely wide, if not infinite.
The dual nature of opposition also conforms well with the
duality that is inherent to the type of thinking implied in
scientific discoveries, as discussed by Platt (1964) in relation to
paramount discoveries in Molecular Biology and Physics in a
short but extremely rich article published in the Science journal.
He bases his claim on a variety of remarkable examples which
demonstrate that the most efficient way for humans to use
their minds when solving scientific questions consists of, at each
step, explicitly setting down the question and the alternative
hypotheses before conducting crucial experiments in order to
exclude some alternatives and then adopt what remains. This
procedure is known as strong inference and it is clearly modeled
in terms of a decision tree (a conditional inductive trees or a
logical tree) in which every time the branches fork, we can choose
to go right or left. Thus, we can reasonably say that opposites, as
conceptualized in this paper, seem to be the cognitive mechanism
underlying the identification of these forks in the branches.
“Thinking in opposites” is a way of thinking which is within
everyone’s reach and can easily become a deliberate thinking
strategy. Due to the fact that the identification of opposites is
sensitive to situations, this strategy can potentially lead to the
creation of an extremely complex, rich set of alternatives for
reasoners to test systematically.
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